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Introduction
Yukako Kurose began working at a department store's corporate office
in 1986, one year after the passage of Japan's first Equal Employment
Opportunity Law (EEOL). 1 Although her career initially seemed promis-
ing, it quickly went downhill after the birth of her daughter. 2 According to
t Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2009; B.A. Cornell University, 2006;
Editor-in-Chief, Cornell International Law Journal, Volume 42. I would like to thank my
esteemed colleagues on the Cornell International Law Journal for their helpful editing. I
would also like to thank my parents for their continual, unwavering support, and my
friends, particularly Bill, for their constant encouragement and advice.
1. Martin Fackler, Career Women in Japan Find a Blocked Path, Despite Equal Oppor-
tunity Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
2. Id.
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Ms. Kurose, her company passed her over for promotions because she fre-
quently left work before 6:30 in the evening to pick up her child.3 Eventu-
ally, the company forced Ms. Kurose into a dead-end clerical job and she
quit.4 Ms. Kurose's struggle to balance both a successful career and a fam-
ily is not unique. Japanese women who try to prove that they can succeed
at both work and family face constant discrimination throughout their
careers.5 Takako Ariishi, the president of a manufacturing company that
supplies gauges to Nissan, is the only woman in a group of approximately
160 Nissan suppliers. 6 Although Ms. Ariishi comes right back to work
after leaving at 7:00 each evening to put her son to bed, she still feels as
though she has "to prove all the time that a woman can be president." 7 For
example, the first time she went to a meeting of Nissan suppliers the men
asked her to wait in another room with the secretaries. 8
Twenty-two years after the Diet enacted the EEOL, Japanese women
still face wage discrimination, limited career opportunities, a lack of
upward mobility, pervasive sexual harassment, and an inability to have
both a successful career and a family.9 In 2003, the average monthly sal-
ary of a female Japanese worker was 66.8% of the average male worker's
earnings, one of the largest wage differentials of all developed nations.10
Moreover, according to the International Labor Organization, in 1985
women held only 6.6% of all management jobs in both Japanese corpora-
tions and government." By 2005, the number of female managerial
employees had risen only to 10.1%.12 Additionally, the United Nation's
2006 "Gender Empowerment Measure" (GEM), which indexes women's
participation in politics and the economy, ranked Japan forty-second out
of seventy-five countries-much lower than other developed nations, such
as the twelfth-ranked United States. 13
Japan has recently taken notice of its gender inequality problem-a
problem that has had a massive effect on their economy as a whole. Japa-
nese women have begun delaying marriage and some refuse to marry at
all. 14 This reluctance to marry has caused the Japanese population to







9. See generally Charles Weathers, Equal Opportunity for Japanese Women: What
Progress?, THE JAPANESE ECON., Winter 2005 -06, at 16 (discussing the EEOL's progress
and future after the 2006 amendments).
10. See GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, CABINET OFFICE, GOV'T OF JAPAN, WHITE PAPER ON
GENDER EQUALITY 2007, at 12 (2007), available at http://www.gender.go.jp/whitepaper/
ewp2007.pdf [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
11. See Fackler, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. See GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, CABINET OFFICE, GoV'T OF JAPAN, GENDER EQUALITY IN
JAPAN 2007, at 7 (2007).
14. See Darlene Budd, Japan's Silent Revolution: Saying No to Marriage and the Sys-
tem?, 5 J. INST. JUST. INT'L STUD. 43, 52 (2005).
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sustain Japan's economy.' 5 As of 2005, the Japanese birthrate was at a low
of 1.26%.16 Analysts estimate that if this downward trend continues, by
2050, the population will decrease to 101 million and that by 2100, it will
fall to 64 million-half of the 2005 population.
17
In 2006, the Japanese government implemented reforms to the EEOL
in an effort to stave off this grim picture. 18 The question remains, however,
are these reforms enough to produce gender equality in the workplace?
This Note argues that a comparison between Japan and Norway reveals
that to remedy Japan's problem of gender equality in the workforce, Japan
must take a more aggressive legislative approach in its gender equality
laws. This aggressive approach includes using positive or affirmative
action, a more aggressive penalty and reward program for complying and
non-complying corporations, refining the child-leave laws, reform of the
tax laws, and a set definition of what constitutes indirect discrimination.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of gender equality in Japan
and the pre-2006 gender equality laws, including the Labor Standards Law
(LSL), the original EEOL, the 1997 EEOL, and the Child Care and Family
Care Law (CCFCL). Part II examines the Japanese gender equality laws as
they stand now, the problems with the current laws, the current status of
Japanese women, and what the Japanese government plans to do to further
women's equality. Part III evaluates the situation of women in Norway and
Norwegian law, particularly focusing on the Norwegian Act Relating to
Gender Equality and the quota system. Part IV focuses on how to integrate
the approach of Norway into Japanese law and society to further gender
equality.
I. History of Japanese Gender Equality and Gender Equality Laws
A. Traditional Role of Japanese Women and the Labor Standards Law
of 1947
Traditional Japanese society stresses the idea of ryousai kenbo, or
"good-wife, wise mother."19 This idea became extremely popular during
the reform period of the late nineteenth century as a way to repress the
popularity of the "working-girl" movement by focusing women's priorities
on the home and family. 20 Since the nineteenth century, ryousai kenbo has
permeated the structure of Japanese society and has helped to limit the
15. See MICHAEL ZIELENZIGER, SHUTTING OUT THE SUN: How JAPAN CREATED ITS OWN
LOST GENERATION 161-62 (2006).
16. GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 12.
17. Budd, supra note 14, at 52.
18. See Megan L. Starich, Comment, The 2006 Revisions to Japan's Equal Opportunity
Employment Law: A Narrow Approach to a Pervasive Problem, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J.
551, 552 (2007).
19. Kelly Barrett, Women in the Workplace: Sexual Discrimination in Japan, HUM. RTS.
BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 5.
20. Id.
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ability of women to be anything but homemakers. 2 1
Although early twentieth century Japanese society mainly relegated
women to the house, Japanese women were not entirely without protection.
TheJapanese Constitution contains an equal rights amendment, Article 14,
that outlaws discrimination based on sex: "All of the people are equal
under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic,
or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family ori-
gin."22 Article 14's protection, however, is weak.2 3 Judges have interpreted
the provision "to apply only to 'unreasonable' discrimination by State
action."24 The reasonableness determination entails a highly fact-specific
inquiry into each case, as well as a consideration of the political and social
conditions of the time. 25 Therefore, the definition of "reasonable action"
can frequently change. Finally, Article 14 also has extremely limited utility
as it only protects against public sector discrimination. 26
During the post-World War II American occupation, however, the
Labour Standards Law (LSL) brought about further protections. 2 7 This law
delineates rules and standards governing working conditions and contracts
for both men and women,2 8 but the LSL only mandates equal treatment of
men and women with regard to wages. 2 9 Although an employer cannot
discriminatorily pay a worker "by reason of the worker being a woman,"30
if the employer can provide a non-gender based justification, then disparate
pay is permissible. 3 1 This ability to discriminate, however, has limits. For
example, employers cannot fire a female worker during her maternity leave,
before and after childbirth, or within thirty days of the leave expiring.3 2
This provision allows pregnant mothers to take maternity leave without
fear of losing their jobs.33
The main effect the LSL had on women came from its protectionist
provisions.3 4 The LSL restricted women from performing harmful or
21. See M. Christina Luera, Comment, No More Waiting for Revolution: Japan Should
Take Positive Action to Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, 13 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 611, 612 (2004).
22. KENPO, art. 14 (Japan), translated in CURTIS J. MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY 738 (2006).
23. See Jennifer S. Fan, From Office Ladies to Women Warriors?: The Effect of the EEOL
on Japanese Women, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 111 (1999).
24. Id. (citation omitted).
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Michiko Aizawa, An International Perspective: A Proposal to Combine Disparate
Approaches to the Maternal Wall, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 495, 503 (2003).
28. See Rodo Kijyun-Ho [Labour Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, arts. 1-13
(Japan), available at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj-lawl.
pdf.
29. See id. art. 4 ("An employer shall not engage in discriminatory treatment of a
woman as compared with a man with respect to wages").
30. Id.
31. Starich, supra note 18, at 554.
32. See Rodo Kijyun-Ho [Labour Standards Law], art. 19(1).
33. Aizawa, supra note 27, at 504.
34. See id. at 503-04 (detailing the various protectionist provisions of the LSL).
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strenuous work, such as heavy lifting, during pregnancy and one year after
giving birth.35 Additionally, these women could request a transfer to "light
duties" 36 and exemption from overtime 37 and night work.38 Finally,
women had the right to up to fourteen weeks of maternity leave-six weeks
prior to the birth and eight weeks after the birth. 39 Only six of the weeks
following the birth, however, were mandatory.40 Once the woman
returned to work, a woman with a child under one year of age could take
two unpaid thirty-minute breaks per day.4 1 "The rationale [for these pro-
tections] was that women are physically weaker than men" and require
more time for their familial and household duties. 4 2 Although some of
these protections, including the mandatory maternity leave and the ability
for a woman to be exempt from overtime if she so requests, are beneficial to
working mothers, the LSL fell short in many ways. By limiting its equal
employment protections only to wages, the LSL left employers free to dis-
criminate in other areas such as hiring, training, promotion, firing, and job
assignment-to name but a few.
4 3
The inadequacies of the LSL soon became obvious, and during the
1960s, the courts stepped in to help remedy some of the problems by creat-
ing a legal standard called the "public order doctrine."'4 4 The courts devel-
oped the "public order doctrine" from Article 90 of the Civil Code, which
states that "[a] juristic act which has for its object such matters as are con-
trary to public policy or good morals is null and void."'4 5 From the 1960s
to the 1980s, the courts repeatedly applied this doctrine in cases in which
employers forced women to retire upon the birth of a child, pregnancy, or
marriage. 4 6 A woman's "retirement" was important in the life of a corpora-
tion because it permitted her post to be filled by a younger woman-a
potential new wife for one of the corporation's managers. 4 7 In Matsuro v.
Mitsui Shipbuilding Corporation,48 the employer required all female employ-
ees to retire upon marriage.4 9 The woman could apply for a service exten-
sion (kinmu ench6) or an employment extension (koy6 ench6) but the
35. See Rodo Kijyun-Ho [Labour Standards Law), art. 64-3(1).
36. See id. art 65(3).
37. See id. art 66(1).
38. See id. art. 66(3).
39. See id. art. 65(1), (2).
40. See id. art. 65(2).
41. See id. art. 67(1).
42. See Aizawa, supra note 27, at 505.
43. See Starich, supra note 18, at 554.
44. Id. at 555.
45. See MINPO, art. 90 (Japan), translated in CURTISJ. MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 22,
at 738; see also Starich, supra note 18, at 555.
46. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWARJAPAN 133 (1987); see also
Tokyu Kikan Kogyo, 20 RosHu 715 (Tokyo D. Ct., Jul. 1, 1969) (invalidating employer's
mandatory retirement policy for women who reached thirty years of age), cited in
Starich, supra note 18, at 555 n.25.
47. Budd, supra note 14, at 49.
48. 2 R6minshfi 1163 (Osaka D. Ct., Dec. 10, 1971) (Japan), translated in CURTISJ.
MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 22, at 572.
49. See id.
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woman had to stop working upon the birth of her first child. 50 The Osaka
District Court found that "[plublic order prohibits unreasonable sex-based
discrimination and restriction on the freedom of marriage '5 1 and that the
mandatory retirement system constituted discrimination. 52 Additionally,
the court noted that although a female employee who takes maternity leave
can create some inconvenience for the employer, the employer must bear
this inconvenience and not try to avoid it by firing the employee. 53
Although this decision marked a major milestone in the struggle for
gender equality in employment, much of the court's language demon-
strates the still pervasive idea of ryousai kenbo. For example, the court
states, "[O]f course ... it is a tenet common to all countries that, as a rule,
once a man and woman have entered into marriage, the wife will manage
household affairs." 54 Moreover, the court discusses the "essential differ-
ences of the sexes" and the ability for employers to use "rational sex-based
discrimination. '5 5 The use of this language helped to maintain the
employer's ability to discriminate based on gender and shows that courts
in the pre-EEOL era were reluctant to go too far in support of gender equal-
ity.5 6 Use of the courts to further gender equality in employment has also
been ineffective due to Japan's civil law jurisdiction that stresses statutes
over judicial decisions. 5 7 Because judicial decisions are not binding on
later cases, litigation can be uncertain and risky.58 Additionally, litigation
is very expensive and long, taking at least five years to move through the
district court.59
Because Japan's early gender equality measures had proven largely
ineffective, a change was on the horizon by the end of the 1960s. The
1970s brought increased worldwide gender consciousness, and the 1975
UN-designated "International Women's Year" and "Decade for Women"
helped to spur further reform in Japan.60
B. CEDAW: The Impetus for Change
Japan enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1985
mainly to appease the United Nations and mollify international opinion.6 1
In fact, the Director of the Ministry of Labor's (MOL) Women's Bureau
asserted that Japan would not have enacted the EEOL by 1985 if not for the
50. Id.
51. Id. at 580.
52. Id. at 573.
53. Id. at 578.
54. Id. at 577.
55. Id. at 574.
56. See Starich, supra note 18, at 555 (discussing how courts have been reluctant to
utilize the public order doctrine to invalidate discriminatory promotion and hiring
practices).
57. See Barrett, supra note 19, at 6-7.
58. See id. at 7.
59. Id. (the District Court is the second-level trial court in Japan and is subject to
review by the Japanese Supreme Court).
60. See Fan, supra note 23, at 114.
61. Weathers, supra note 9, at 18.
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UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). 62 CEDAW has two main functions.63 First, it defines
discrimination against women and provides parties to the treaty with the
ideal vision of gender equality.64 Second, CEDAW provides parties with
the legal framework for creating a gender-equal society.
65
CEDAW defines "discrimination against women" as "any distinction,
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women ... of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field."66 The treaty also has a
special provision that calls for equal employment rights for men and
women.6 7 This provision emphasizes women's right to have the same
employment opportunities based on the same criteria as men, as well as
their right to receive the same pay and benefits as men for equal work.68
CEDAW does not allow a party's culture to hinder a woman's exercise of
her fundamental rights.69 To ratify the treaty, a country must take "all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development
and advancement of women,"70 including abolishing laws, practices, or
customs that constitute discrimination against women.7 1 In addition to
regular legislation, CEDAW allows parties to adopt "temporary measures"
aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women without
that measure constituting discrimination. 72
Japan committed itself to signing and ratifying CEDAW by 1985.
7 3
This deadline helped to move the treaty through the Diet in the face of
opposition from business leaders and labor unions.7 4 Business leaders
feared that equal employment opportunities would end the post-World War
II economic growth and that women could not fill the "corporate warrior"
role and tradition of lifetime employment due to their other societal duties
of child-rearing and caring for elderly parents. 75 Additionally, labor
unions called for maintaining the special protections in the labor law
because they feared that weakening those protections would allow busi-
62. Fan, supra note 23, at 115.
63. See Luera, supra note 21, at 615.
64. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 1, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
65. See id. art. 2.
66. See id. art. 1.
67. See id. art. 11.
68. See id.
69. See id. art. 5(a) (requiring states "Itlo modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to [eliminating] prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women").
70. Id. art. 3.
71. Id. art. 2(f).
72. See id. art. 4.
73. Fan, supra note 23, at 114.
74. See UPHAM, supra note 46, at 149-50 (further discussing the ongoing debate
between business leaders and labor unions); Fan, supra note 23, at 114-16.
75. Fan, supra note 23, at 116.
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nesses to underpay women and subject them to poor working conditions. 76
The resulting EEOL legislation was a "compromise between the pressure to
comply with [CEDAW] and the unwillingness of the business community
to concede anything which might affect industrial productivity and
profit."
' 7 7
C. The EEOL and Its Immediate Effects
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law updated the Labour Stan-
dards Law by discouraging gender discrimination in five areas: recruitment
and hiring, job assignment and promotion, vocational training, employee
benefits, and retirement and dismissal. 78 Under the EEOL, employers have
two types of duties: kinshi (prohibited) and doryoku (best efforts). 79 The
kinshi duties are stricter, prohibiting employers from discriminating with
regard to retirement age, discharge, and voluntary resignation. 80 The dory-
oku duties require the employer only to endeavor not to discriminate in
advertisements, hiring, job placement, and promotions.81 Therefore, the
original EEOL did not prohibit employers from discriminating; rather, the
employer simply had to make a "good faith effort" to achieve equal oppor-
tunity in the workplace.82
In addition to creating the doryoku and kinshi duties, the EEOL signifi-
cantly amended the LSL's special protections. 83 After the passage of the
EEOL, women could work more than six hours of overtime a week and past
10 p.m.8 4 In addition, pregnant women could "work until six weeks before
their due dates and [could] return to work six weeks after giving birth [as
long as they] work at a job which a doctor certifies will not be harmful to
them. "85
Problematically, the EEOL did not create penalties for violations of the
kinshi or doryoku duties.86 Employees did not have a private right of action
under the EEOL and the EEOL did not mandate any form of civil or crimi-
76. Charles Weathers, In Search of Strategic Partners: Japan's Campaign for Equal
Opportunity, 8 Soc. SCI. JAPAN J. 69, 74 (2005); see also UPHAM, supra note 46, at 150
(noting that business leaders wanted to eliminate the special protections claiming that
women could never be truly equal with the protections in place).
77. Fan, supra note 23, at 117.
78. See Koyo no Bun'yo ni Okeru Danjo no Pinto na Kikai oyobi Taigu no Kakuho to
Joshi-Rodosha no Fukushi no Zoshin ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal
Opportunity and Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment of 1972], Act No.
113, arts. 7-11, amended by Act No. 45 of 1985, arts. 7-11 (Japan), cited in NAT'L INST.
OF EMPLOYMENT AND VOCATIONAL RESEARCH, JAPAN, WOMEN WORKERS IN JAPAN 96-97
(1988) [hereinafter 1985 EEOL].
79. Fan, supra note 23, at 118.
80. Id.; see also 1985 EEOL, supra note 78, art. 11 ("With regard to the compulsory
retirement age and dismissal of workers, employers shall not discriminate against a
woman worker as compared with a man ....") (emphasis added).
81. Fan, supra note 23, at 118; see also 1985 EEOL, supra note 78, arts. 7-10.
82. Starich, supra note 18, at 557.
83. See Fan, supra note 23, at 119-20.
84. See id. at 120 & n.101 (citing 1985 EEOL, supra note 78, arts. 61, 64-2, 64-3).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 118.
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nal sanctions.8 7 Moreover, although the EEOL provided for three
employee-employer dispute resolution mechanisms,8 8 these mechanisms
proved largely ineffective.8 9 First, parties could come before an in-house
employer/employee grievance resolution committee to discuss the prob-
lem.90 Second, the MOL's Women and Young Workers' office could give
guidance or recommendations to the parties.9 1 Finally, if both parties
agreed, the Equal Opportunity Mediation Commission (EOMC) could pro-
vide mediation.9 2 Under the original EEOL, both parties had to agree to
mediation, 93 and if they did, three MOL-appointed individuals of "learning
and experience" proposed a non-binding settlement. 94
Tadashi Hanami, the Director General for Research of the Japan Insti-
tute of Labour has stated that the "EEOL was born as an ugly duckling and
has never metamorphosed into a swan."'95 The original EEOL had many
problems that helped to turn the law into a paper tiger.96 Because the lax
enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms left women with little
recourse if they experienced discrimination, few took advantage of the
law's provisions. Between 1985 and 1998, only 106 employees applied for
mediation with the EOMC and the Commission mediated only one of these
cases.
9 7
Moreover, the EEOL's mere exhortation that employers "endeavor" not
to discriminate allowed employers to easily circumvent the law.98 In an
effort to avoid equal opportunity, companies developed a "two-track sys-
tem" of employment. 99 The management, or "career," track consisted
largely of males, while the general, or "clerical," track was composed
mainly of females. 10 0 Employees on the two tracks had different duties,
wages, and qualifications. 10 1 Management track employees focused on
corporate development, planning, and negotiations.1 0 2 Additionally, man-
agement track employees had better benefits and wages 10 3 and were able to
be promoted to higher levels in the company than clerical track employ-
ees. 10 4 In contrast, clerical track employees had less significant duties,
87. Id.
88. See 1985 EEOL, supra note 78, arts. 13-15, 18-20.
89. See Starich, supra note 18, at 557.
90. 1985 EEOL, supra note 78, art. 13.
91. Id. art. 14.
92. Id. arts. 18-20.
93. Id. art. 15.
94. Id. art. 17(2).
95. Junko Kumamoto-Healey, Women in the Japanese Labour Market 1947-2003: A
Brief Survey, 144 INT'L LAB. REV. 451, 463 (2005).
96. See Starich, supra note 18, at 557.
97. Fan, supra note 23, at 122.
98. See Starich, supra note 18, at 557.
99. K~zuo SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 132 (Leo Kanowitz trans.,
2d ed. Univ. of Washington Press 1992) (1985).
100. See Starich, supra note 18, at 557-58.
101. See id. at 558.
102. SUGENO, supra note 99.
103. Starich, supra note 18, at 558.
104. SUGENO, supra note 99.
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such as serving tea and mundane office work.10 5 Women in the general
track, therefore, served relatively the same purpose as the ornamental
"office flowers" or "office ladies" of the 1960s and 1970s.106
The qualifications for entering the management track furthered the
discriminatory purpose of keeping the genders separated. 10 7 Many
employers required the ability to speak a foreign language fluently, gradua-
tion from a prestigious university, 10 8 an obligation to work long hours, and
the ability to travel frequently or relocate easily-criteria that although
facially gender neutral more often than not could only be fulfilled by
males. 10 9 For example, the requirement that management track employees
work upwards of 3,000 hours per year is extremely difficult for women
with children to fulfill. 1 0 Kuniko Inoguchi, the former cabinet minister in
charge of gender equality, stressed that "[i]f expected to work 15 hours a
day, then most women will give up."1 1' In addition to facially neutral but
nonetheless discriminatory criteria such as long hours, some employers
required additional qualifications from female candidates not required for
males, including written examinations, interviews, or recommenda-
tions. 112
D. The Aftermath of the EEOL in the Early 1990s
During the 1990s, gender equality in Japan remained stagnant and
disappointing. The interest in promoting women's rights and keeping up
with the rest of the world faded because the issue of equal opportunity was
no longer the primary goal on the global agenda. 113 The marriage of
Japan's Crown Prince Naruhito to Harvard- and Oxford-educated Masako
Owada offers a prime example of the continuation of ryousai kenbo during
the 1990s. 1 1 4 Owada was an intelligent woman who worked for the Japa-
nese Foreign Ministry as a trade representative responsible for negotiations
with the United States and other industrialized nations. 115 During her ten-
ure at the Ministry, the Crown Prince proposed to her. 116 Owada rejected
105. Starich, supra note 18, at 558.
106. See Fan, supra note 23, at 105. It is important to note that women in the manage-
ment track often also needed to fulfill the traditional roles of "office ladies." See id. at
125. For example, a bank employer required a female on the bank's management track
to arrive at work early and "clean ashtrays, wipe off desks, and boil water for tea before
the rest of the staff arrived." Id.
107. See Nakano Mami, Ten Years Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, in
VOICES FROM THE JAPANESE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 72 (AMPO - Japan Asia Quarterly
Review ed., 1996).
108. See Starich, supra note 18, at 558.
109. See id.; SUGENO, supra note 99.
110. See Fan, supra note 23, at 124-25.
111. Fackler, supra note 1.
112. Fan, supra note 23, at 124.
113. Id. at 115.
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the Crown Prince's first two proposals but eventually accepted.11 7 On the
day of her engagement, Owada spoke eight seconds longer than her future
husband and received scathing criticism from the press. 118 From that
moment on, the palace began to control her public appearances. 1 19 The
palace consigned this once powerful representative to photo opportunities,
ceremonies, and walking three steps behind her husband. 120
On the employment front, employers still discriminated against
women during the hiring process. Interviewers frequently asked women
questions that had nothing to do with job performance or scholastic apti-
tude.12 1 For example, during the late 1990s, interviewers often asked
female interviewees about their "suree saizu" or "three sizes": waist, hips,
and bust.122 Other discriminatory questions focused on the woman's mar-
riage plans. 123 Employers also limited their employment search to women
with desirable physical and personal attributes. 124 In the arena of physical
attributes, employers considered "ugly women," "short women-those less
than 140 centimeters," or "women with spectacles" to be "undesirable"
female employees. 125 With regard to personal attributes, Kinokuniya
Shoten, a Japanese bookstore chain, characterized undesirable female
applicants as "divorcees, women who belong to political or religious
groups, women who respect passionate artists such as Vincent Van Gogh,
... women living in rented rooms and daughters of professors or wives of
teachers."'12 6 Discrimination, however, did not simply occur in the hiring
process. 12 7 Surveys indicate that during the economic slowdown of 1991,
the hiring cutbacks affected women the most. 1 28
Many government policies during the 1980s and 1990s also helped to
limit equal opportunity for women in the employment sector. The govern-
117. Id. Many people say that Owada finally accepted the marriage proposal because
after the second refusal, Owada's father, a prominent foreign ministry diplomat, was told





121. See Barrett, supra note 19, at 8; see also Mami, supra note 107, at 70.
122. Weathers, supra note 9, at 19.
123. See Barrett, supra note 19, at 8.
124. See Mami, supra note 107, at 70 (discussing how interviewers often "intention-
ally and persistently [took] up the subject of looks and physical appearance"). Moreo-
ver, many women received training from their employers to achieve the "ideal" standard
of etiquette. See Fan, supra note 23, at 109. "For example, female workers at Normura
Securities are 'drilled by former Japan Air Lines stewardesses in bowing, walking, smil-
ing, telephone etiquette, tea service, and sitting."' Id. at 109-10 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 109.
126. Id.
127. See Mami, supra note 107, at 67-68, 70-72 (providing examples of gender dis-
criminatory practices, such as the female-male wage differential, the low numbers of
female managers, and the large percentage of women who are "non-regular," or part-time
workers).
128. Weathers, supra note 76, at 74; see also Mami, supra note 107, at 69 (noting that
new female graduates faced greater obstacles than their male peers in the employment
search during the recession).
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ment enacted tax breaks for couples in which one spouse earns 1.03 mil-
lion yen per year or less,129 approximately $10,000 U.S. dollars. 130
Women who make more than the stipulated maximum risk having to work
more hours to counterbalance the tax penalty that they receive, making it
even more difficult for these women to raise a family.' 3 ' Additionally, if a
woman makes more than 1.4 million yen per year, the woman is no longer
entitled to be included in her husband's pension plan. 132 Finally, during
the 1980s, the government decreased the amount of funding directed
toward child care centers, even though women's work participation was on
the rise. 133 These policies had the combined effect of encouraging women
to remain home as caregivers or to work only part-time. 134 Due in large
part to these policies, women's participation in the work force continued to
mirror an "M-shaped curve" with decreased female employment during the
ages of 25-29 and a low point during the peak child-rearing ages of thirty
to thirty-four. 135
Not all government policies from the 1980s through the mid-1990s
stalled gender equality. In response to an unexpected decrease in the
birthrate, 136 the Diet passed the Child Care Leave Law (CCLL) in 1991.137
The CCLL allowed workers who were raising their own child, adopted or
biological, in their own homes to request that the employer grant them
child care leave until the child reached the age of one. 138 An employer
could not refuse to grant leave unless the requesting employee had worked
for the company for less than one year or had a spouse who could "ordina-
rily take care of the child."'139 A person's spouse could "ordinarily take
care of the child" if the spouse was either not employed or was taking child
care or another form of leave. 14 This restriction meant that under the
CCLL, a father and mother could not take leave together. 141 Because of the
ideals of ryousai kenbo that still permeated Japanese society, it was
unlikely that a man would take leave to care for his child in order to allow
his wife to pursue her career. In addition to child care leave, the CCLL
provided that employers should permit some accommodations, such as
reduction in working hours, a flexible work arrangement, or installing a
child care facility, to make it easier for women with children younger than
129. Weathers, supra note 76, at 74-75.
130. ZIELENZIGER, supra note 15, at 170.
131. See Budd, supra note 14, at 47.
132. ZIELENZIGER, supra note 15, at 170.
133. Weathers, supra note 76, at 75.
134. See id.
135. See GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 10.
136. Aizawa, supra note 27, at 508-11; Starich, supra note 18, at 559.
137. Ikuji-Kyugyo-tou ni kansuru Horitsu [Child Care Leave Law of 1991], Law No.
76 of 1991 (Japan), cited in Aizawa, supra note 27, at 509 n.73.
138. Aizawa, supra note 27, at 509.
139. Id. (noting that there are several exceptions to the coverage, including employ-
ment on a day-to-day basis, employment for a fixed term, or union agreements).
140. Id. at 510.
141. Id.
Vol. 41
2008 Taming the Paper Tiger
one year of age to work.
1 42
In 1995, the Diet revised the CCLL and renamed it the Child Care and
Family Care Leave Law (CCFCLL). 1 43 The CCFCLL not only granted
employees leave to care for children but also to care for a family member.
As in the CCLL, the employer could not refuse to grant leave unless the
employee met the above-stated conditions. 1 44 Neither the CCLL nor the
1995 CCFCLL required an employer to pay an employee who took leave. 14 5
The Employment Insurance Law, however, required the employment insur-
ance fund to pay 25% of the employee's wages during the worker's child
care leave. 14 6 Unfortunately, this benefit did not apply when the worker
took leave to care for a family member. 1 47
E. 1997 Revisions
By the mid-1990s, the pitfalls and failures of the 1985 EEOL became
obvious. Japan still faced an ever-decreasing birthrate, a dwindling
workforce, and increased litigation challenging gender discrimination in
employment. 1 48 These pervasive problems helped to spur the 1997 revi-
sions to the EEOL. 14 9 In addition, a July 1996 report from the Office for
Gender Equality (OGE), 150 as well as the United Nation's Fourth World
Conference on Women in 1995, may have helped to rekindle the feeling of
gender consciousness in Japan. 15 1
The 1997 revision sought to strengthen the old EEOL in a number of
ways. First, the revision changed the duty to "'endeavor' not to discrimi-
nate" into an outright prohibition against discrimination in recruiting and
hiring, 1 52 as well as prohibiting discrimination in the areas of promotions,
training, and job assignments.' 5 3 This prohibition against discriminatory
142. Id. at 510-11 (noting that an employer only has the duty to endeavor to make
these accommodations available for a woman once her child reaches one year of age).
143. Ikuji-Kyugyo, Kaigo-kyugyo-tou Ikuji mataha Kazoku Kaigo wo Okonau Rodo-
sha no Fukushi ni kansuru Horitsu [Child Care and Family-Care Leave Law], Law No.
107 of 1995 (Japan), cited in Aizawa, supra note 27, at 511 n.87; see Kumamoto-Healey,
supra note 95, at 464.




148. See Aizawa, supra note 27, at 511-12; Starich, supra note 18, at 559.
149. See Starich, supra note 18, at 559. It is important to note that although Japan
enacted the revisions in 1997, they did not take effect until April 1999. Id. As such,
these revisions are sometimes referred to as the "1999 Revision."
150. The Japanese government created the OGE in July 1994. See Weathers, supra
note 76, at 75. The OGE consists of feminist leaders, academics, and national bureau-
crats who examined the old EEOL and suggested revisions to solve the birthrate issue.
See Starich, supra note 18, at 559.
151. See Weathers, supra note 76, at 75.
152. See Koyo no Bun'yo ni Okeru Danjo no Pinto na Kikai oyobi Taigu no Kakuho to
Joshi-Rodosha no Fukushi no Zoshin ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal
Opportunity and Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment of 1972], Act No.
113, art. 5, amended by Act No. 92 of 1997, art. 5 (Japan) (emphasis added), translated
in MILHAUPT ET AL., supra note 22, at 738 [hereinafter 1997 EEOL].
153 See id. art 6
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recruitment included banning the utilization of gender- specific ads asking
for "females only" or using gender-specific job titles such as "waitress."' 154
Second, the revision granted the employee the right to unilaterally force an
employer into mediation with the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare
(MHLW). 155 Importantly to employees, Article 13 of the Revised EEOL
prohibited an employer from taking retaliatory actions, including dis-
charge, against an employee who requests mediation. 156 If the employer
did not comply with mediation, the MHLW could make a "public
announcement" to the media regarding the non-complying company.' 5 7
These changes in the EEOL also caused the Diet to amend the LSL, abolish-
ing the protective provisions that restricted women from overtime and late-
night work. 158
One of the most important effects of the 1997 revision, however, was
that it recognized sexual harassment as a type of gender discrimination.159
The inclusion of sexual harassment, or seku hara, in the 1997 EEOL was
especially noteworthy because seku hara was not even a part of the Japa-
nese language until 1989.160 Although Japanese courts previously had
held that employers could be found liable for an employee's sexually
harassing conduct, 161 the 1997 Amendments required employers to affirm-
atively prevent employees from engaging in sexually harassing behavior in
the workplace. 162 Article 21 of the 1997 Amendments provides that
"[elmployers shall give necessary consideration . .. so that [the] women
workers they employ do not suffer any disadvantage in their working con-
ditions by reason of said women workers' responses to sexual speech and
behavior in the workplace and [that] their working environments do not
suffer any harm."'163 The 1997 revision also requires the Ministry of Labor
to release guidelines to classify and define the two types of sexual harass-
ment, quid pro quo and hostile work environment, and to inform employ-
ers of their obligations under the EEOL. 164 Under these guidelines,
employers must explain their sexual harassment policies and make them
known to all of their employees. 165 Employers must also implement a
154. Fan, supra note 23, at 134.
155. See 1997 EEOL, supra note 152, art. 14.
156. See id. art. 13(2).
157. See id. art 26.
158. Fan, supra note 23, at 134.
159. See 1997 EEOL, supra note 152, art. 21.
160. Fan, supra note 23, at 126.
161. See KAzuo SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 176-77 (Leo
Kanowitz trans., 5th ed. Carolina Academic Press 2002) (1985) (discussing various sex-
ual harassment cases including many in which the courts held employers liable for an
employee's misconduct).
162. See 1997 EEOL, supra note 152, art. 21(1).
163. Id.
164. See id. art. 21(2); SUGENO, supra note 161, at 175-76. Some of the guidelines
that one government agency issued give such specific examples as: "[d]on't force a
woman to sing karaoke with you," "[dion't coerce her into dancing," and "[d]on't peep
into her locker room." Mark Magnier, Equality Evolving in Japan, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1999, at A12.
165. Fan, supra note 23, at 136.
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scheme for dealing with sexual harassment complaints and for counseling
sexual harassment victims. 166 Finally, employers faced with sexual harass-
ment claims must immediately gauge the extent of the sexual harassment
and successfully deal with the problem. 16 7
The new sexual harassment provision had an immediate effect. Sexual
harassment complaints skyrocketed from roughly four a year in the early
1990s to 2,534 in fiscal year 1997 and 7,019 in fiscal year 1998.168 In the
late 1990s, a female Cabinet member accused Japan's "Minister of Gender
Equality," Hiromu Nonaka, of sexual harassment for suggesting to her that
she should marry-implying that she should become pregnant and set an
example for other women to reverse Japan's low birthrate. 169 Women
began to file complaints against other prominent individuals as well.
170
For example, a well-known television producer was arrested and charged
with molesting a nineteen-year-old woman on the subway, conduct that
Japanese society used to tolerate. 17 1 The producer spent two days in jail
and then quit his job in disgrace. 172
The 1997 revision, however, was not completely successful. Most
notably, the system for enforcing the 1997 EEOL, publication, was incredi-
bly weak. 173 Although one might think that in the consensus culture of
Japan, publishing the names of violators would provide sufficient deter-
rence, the companies simply have no incentive to follow the law.1 74 Moreo-
ver, the "sting" of publication was basically an empty threat. As of August
2007, the MHLW had never published the names of any EEOL violators. 175
Additionally, the 1997 EEOL did not address the serious problem of indi-
rect discrimination-employer requirements or actions that are neutral on
their face but result in disproportionate, detrimental treatment of one
sex. 176 Moreover, the revision only protected women and did not include
protections for men. 17 7 Lastly, recovery on sexual harassment claims was
also problematic under the 1997 revision. 1 78 The amounts that the courts
rewarded in sexual harassment suits were not large, and female complain-
ants often lost their jobs. 179 Additionally, sexual harassment cases are
subject to very stringent standards of proof, and the weak Japanese discov-
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Weathers, supra note 76, at 79.
169. Magnier, supra note 164, at Al.
170. See id. at A12.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Fan, supra note 23, at 137.
174. See Starich, supra note 18, at 560.
175. See Fackler, supra note 1, at A6.
176. SUGENO, supra note 161, at 171.
177. See generally 1997 EOL, supra note 152, arts. 5-9 (discussing the importance of
providing female workers with gender equality but not delineating similar equality
requirements for men).
178. See Weathers, supra note 76, at 79-80.
179. Id. at 79.
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ery laws do not aid lawyers who attempt to try these cases. 18 0 Thus, the
trials simply take too long and the awards are too meager to make the effort
to sue worthwhile. 18 1
It is also worth noting that in 1999, the Diet passed the Basic Law for a
Gender-Equal Society.' 8 2 This law articulated five main principles: (1)
respect for the human rights of women and men, (2) social systems and
practices should have as neutral an impact as possible on social activities,
(3) women and men should have the opportunity to participate together as
equal partners in planning and deciding policies of the government and
private bodies, (4) the activities of family life should be compatible with
other activities, and (5) Japan should strive for international cooperation to
help achieve its goals.' 8 3 The goal of this basic law was to provide govern-
ment agencies and private organizations with the ideal tenets of gender
equality to which they should strive.18 4
II. Status of Japanese Women and Japanese Gender Equality Law
Today
A. Why Another Reform?
Increasing gender equality litigation, the still decreasing birthrate, and
demands from the international community, particularly the United
Nations, all led the Diet to reform the EEOL in 2006.185 In 2003, the
CEDAW Committee gave an "unusually stinging criticism" of Japan's lim-
ited compliance with the goals of CEDAW.18 6 The Committee focused on
a variety of areas, including Japan's failure to define and eliminate the
problem of indirect discrimination,' 8 7 the persistence of gender stereo-
types,188 and the lack of female representatives in the political sphere. 18 9
The two-track employment system also remained an ever-pervasive prob-
lem. In 2000, 91.3% of companies "had a general track to be followed by
... newly-hired female employees"-up 3% from 1998.190 Additionally,
85.7% of businesses reported that less than 10% of female employees held
management track positions. 19 1
180. Id. at 80, 82.
181. See id. at 80.
182. See GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 18.
183. Id.; see also Danjo ky6d6 sankaku shakai kihonh6 [Basic Law for Equal Social
Participation by Men and Women], Law No. 78 of 1999, arts. 3-7 (Japan).
184. See Weathers, supra note 76, at 78.
185. See Starich, supra note 18, at 561.
186. Weathers, supra note 9, at 21; see generally Comm. on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, Consideration of Reports of States Parties: Japan, Fourth and
Fifth Periodic Reports, 1 21-42, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2003/l/CRP.3/Add.1/Rev.1
(July 18, 2003) (prepared by Christine Kapalata).
187. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra note
186, 1 22.
188. See id. 23.
189. See id. 32.
190. See Kumamoto-Healey, supra note 95, at 453-54.
191. Id. at 454.
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In 2002, the Tokyo District Court, however, dealt the two-track system
a blow by declaring that it was illegal for Nomura Securities Company to
operate a management scheme that differentiated between hiring men and
women. 19 2 Lawyer Mami Nakano called the ruling "a warning to compa-
nies that violate the constitution by using the two-track system as a cover
for discrimination against women." 193 Nevertheless, the court limited the
verdict only to damages accruing after April 1999, the date of the enact-
ment of the 1997 revisions to the EEOL. 19 4 This limitation means that
Nomura will not have to compensate the twelve female plaintiffs for much
of the difference in salaries with their male colleagues. 195 Furthermore,
the court focused only on two-track systems that companies apply discrim-
inatorily and as a cover for discrimination, not on two-track employment
systems in general. Although the majority of two-track systems are clearly
discriminatory, the fact that trials center on subjective standards of dis-
crimination and last for many years may give employers the incentive to
continue using this system. 19 6
Although use of the two-track system has been on the decline, Japa-
nese businesses have continued to discriminate against women. Since
1998, the utilization of part-time, or non-regular, workers has become the
main obstacle to achieving gender equality.19 7 Between 1997 and 2004,
"the number of regular positions [in Japan] decreased by 4.32 million and
the number of non-regular positions increased by 3.97 million."'198 These
non-regular workers are not given regular wages, have few or no social
security or fringe benefits, and earn about 40% of what regular workers
do. 199 Problematically for women, employers have started to use non-regu-
lar workers in the same way as they had used clerical-track employees.20 0
As of 2005, 52.4% of part-time workers were women who earned 8% less
than their part-time male counterparts. 20 1
By 2005, the female-male wage differential was approximately 67%
and only 10.1% of managers in the workforce were females. 20 2 Moreover,
192. Id. at 451; see also Barrett, supra note 19, at 7 (discussing the 2000 Shiba
Shinkin Bank decision, which took thirteen years to decide, in which the court ruled
that the bank's requirement of passing a test or allowing personnel evaluations as a
substitute to qualify for a promotion, with the discriminatory result that most men were
promoted and most women not, was illegal).
193. Companies Are Being Forced to Confront Sexual Discrimination After a Landmark
Ruling Against Nomura, Says Bayan Rahman, FT.coM, Apr. 17, 2002, at 2 [hereinafter
Landmark Ruling].
194. See Weathers, supra note 76, at 81.
195. Landmark Ruling, supra note 193, at 3.
196. See Weathers, supra note 9, at 22-23.
197. Id. at 28.
198. Id. at 17.
199. Id. at 24.
200. See id. at 28; see also Mami, supra note 107, at 67 (noting that the trend toward
part-time work for women started even earlier than 1998 and citing statistics that
between 1985 and 1993 2.9 million of the 4.6 million women who entered the workforce
worked part-time).
201. GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 11.
202. Id. at 9, 11.
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a 2005 survey reported that 63% of Japanese firms were not planning to
recruit women. 20 3 Most importantly, by 2005, the birthrate had hit a new
low of 1.26%.204 As a result, the Council for Gender Equality commis-
sioned an international comparison to study the effect of gender equality
and birthrate.20 5 The study found that by 2000 there was a positive corre-
lation between women's labor participation and a higher birthrate, but in
1970, the correlation was negative. 20 6 The study concluded that the rela-
tionship between the two variables was not fixed but rather that the social
environment caused the different results.20 7 Looking at the social environ-
ments of countries with increasing birthrates, such as the United States
and Norway, the study concluded that these countries have diverse policies
and systems for child care that make different lifestyle choices possible. 20 8
The study found that to increase its birthrate, Japan should try to improve
in areas, such as flexibility and equal employment opportunities. 20 9 With
these ideals in mind, the Diet enacted the 2006 Amendments to the
EEOL.2 10
B. 2006 EEOL Reform and Other Recently Adopted Laws
The 2006 revision made many changes to the EEOL. The new lan-
guage of the EEOL makes it broadly applicable to both men and women. 2 11
For example, the revision states: "[T]he basic principle of this Act is that
workers be enabled to engage in full working lives, with respect for mater-
nity in the case of women workers but without discrimination based on sex
for all workers."2 12 This change in language is of far more than structural
importance because it changes the crux of the law from protectionism to
equality. 2 13
Secondly, the 2006 revision prohibits indirect discrimination but
balks before defining the concept, instead delegating the task to the MHLW
by giving it the authority to promulgate ministerial ordinances that help
define prohibited forms of indirect discrimination. 214 Currently, the
203. Abdullah Al Madani, Gender Equality Gains Support in Male-Dominated Japan,
GULF NEws (Dubai, U.A.E.), Feb. 26, 2006.
204. GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 12.
205. See generally COUNCIL FOR GENDER EQUAL., SPECIALIST COMM. ON THE DECLINING
BIRTHRATE AND GENDER-EQUAL PARTICIPATION, GOVT OF JAPAN, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
OF THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT REGARDING THE DECLINING BIRTHRATES AND GENDER-EQUALITY
SUMMARY REPORT (2006).
206. See id. at 1.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 2.
209. Id.
210. See Starich, supra note 18, at 561.
211. See generally Koyo no Bun'yo ni Okeru Danjo no Pinto na Kikai oyobi Taigu no
Kakuho to Joshi-Rodosha no Fukushi no Zoshin ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act on Securing,
Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment Between Men and Women in Employment of
1972], Act No. 113, arts. 1-7, amended by Act No. 82 of 2006, arts. 1-7 (Japan) (empha-
sis added) [hereinafter 2006 EEOL].
212. Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
213. See Starich, supra note 18, at 562.
214. See 2006 EEOL, supra note 211, arts. 7, 10.
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MHLW ordinances prohibit three forms of indirect discrimination: (1)
establishing height and weight requirements in hiring and recruitment, (2)
requiring management-track employees to accept transfers to any location
in Japan, and (3) mandating that promotion candidates have previously
been transferred to other locations.2 15 To pass muster under the EEOL, an
employer who utilizes the above criteria must either show that these
requirements are rationally related to the type of work in question or that
some other rational reason justifies having these criteria. 216  If the
employer cannot do so, then any of the above criteria constitute indirect
discrimination and violate the statute.
2 17
Thirdly, the law expands the prohibition of discrimination based on
sex to the areas of demotion, 21 8 "change in job type or employment sta-
tus,"2 19 and "encouragement of retirement, mandatory retirement age, dis-
missal, and renewal of the labor contract." 220 These prohibitions are
extremely important, particularly when coupled with the increased protec-
tion of Article 9 for women taking maternity or child care leave.2 2 1 Article
9 of the revised law prohibits employers from dismissing a woman or treat-
ing her disadvantageously because of marriage, pregnancy, or childbirth,
or because she requested leave due to pregnancy or childbirth. 22 2 Addi-
tionally, an employer may not fire a female worker during her pregnancy,
within one year of giving birth, or for requesting child care leave unless the
employer can prove a valid reason other than pregnancy or leave for child
care.
22 3
In addition to revisions to the EEOL, the Diet has also enacted recent
revisions to the CCFCLL. 22 4 For example, if continued leave is "particu-
larly necessary for continued employment" of the worker, maternity leave
can be extended to one-and-a-half years. 225 The employer, as in the past, is
not obligated to pay the employee, but employment insurance can pay up
to 40% of the employee's previous earnings. 226 Finally, if the worker has a
child younger than elementary school age, the employee has the right to
215. Starich, supra note 18, at 563.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. 2006 EEOL, supra note 211, art. 6(i).
219. Id. art 6(iii).
220. Id. art. 6(iv).
221. See Starich, supra note 18, at 564.
222. 2006 EEOL, supra note 211, art. 9(1)-(3).
223. See id. art. 9(3)-(4).
224. See Michiyo Morozumi, Special Protection, Equality and Beyond: Working Life and
Parenthood Under Japanese Law, 27 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 513, 521 (2006).
225. Ikuji-Kyugyo, Kaigo-kyugyo-tou Ikuji mataha Kazoku Kaigo wo Okonau Rodo-
sha no Fukushi ni kansuru Horitsu [Child Care and Family Care Leave Law], Law No.
76 of 1991, amended by Law No. 50 of 2004, art. 5 1 3 (Japan), available at http://www.
mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/koyou/ryouritu/english/el.html (emphasis added) [hereinaf-
ter CCFCLL 2004].
226. Koyo-Hoken-Ho [Employment Insurance Law], Law No. 116 of 1974, art. 61-
7(4), available at http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_lawl1.
pdf.
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five unpaid leave days to take care of the sick or injured child,227 and the
employee can request a limit on overtime work 228 and an exemption from
night work.229 Additionally, the employer "shall take measures" to facili-
tate shorter working hours for employees with children below the age of
three.230 Although these protections are in place, when the "special
period" from pregnancy to one-and-a-half years of age elapses, working par-
ents with small children are expected to balance their needs with that of the
employer and many of the above protections can be rejected if approval
"would impede normal business operations. ' 231 Moreover, once the child
reaches elementary school age, approximately six years old, the parents no
longer have any kind of statutory protection under this Act. 23 2
C. Problems with the Law
Although the EEOL and CCFCLL have greatly expanded in scope,
problems remain. First, the definition of indirect discrimination is still too
narrow, vague, and difficult to apply. 233 The discussions of the Labor Pol-
icy Council's Subcommittee on Equal Employment defined "indirect dis-
crimination" as "when rules, standards and customs appear facially to be
gender neutral but one sex is receiving substantially disadvantageous treat-
ment, and that treatment has no relationship to job duties and no legal or
rational basis."'234 Although this definition would need to be polished
before the EEOL can utilize it, the subcommittee definition proves that
"indirect discrimination" can be defined and that lawmakers have defined
it in the past.235 Without a working definition of indirect discrimination,
it is very difficult for courts to know exactly what could constitute a viola-
tion of the EEOL. Additionally, the MHLW ordinances currently give only
three examples of what could constitute indirect discrimination. "Count-
less manifestations" are not covered, such as necessitating that welfare and
family benefits be registered to the head of the household, giving regular
employees preferential treatment and better benefits than non-regular
employees even when non-regular workers perform the same work, and
requiring certain academic backgrounds. 236 Although the MHLW
included the caveat that the list of the three examples of indirect discrimi-
nation is not exclusive and that courts could find other forms of indirect
discrimination, 237 the difficulty and longevity of the court process in
227. lkuji-Kyugyo, Kaigo-kyugyo-tou Ikuji mataha Kazoku Kaigo wo Okonau Rodo-
sha no Fukushi ni kansuru Horitsu [Child Care and Family Care Leave Law], art. 16-2.
228. Id. art. 17.
229. Id. art. 19.
230. Id. art. 23(1).
231. See id. art. 17 (discussing how the limitation on overtime for working mothers
needs to be restricted if granting the woman's request would impede the normal opera-
tions of business).
232. Morozumi, supra note 224, at 526.
233. See Weathers, supra note 9, at 22.
234. Starich, supra note 18, at 573.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 566.
237. Id. at 567.
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Japan means that litigating other possible situations of indirect discrimina-
tion will be tedious and complicated.
Second, the 2006 revision does not impose an affirmative duty on
employers to provide accommodations to working women with children.
The revised law only speaks in negative terms about prohibitions rather
than in positive terms creating duties. 238 Although the 2006 EEOL does
permit employers to take steps to help the situation of working mothers,239
the 2006 EEOL neither provides guidance as to what these steps should be
nor does it mandate any form of positive action. The revised CCFCLL
gives some guidance regarding shortening work hours and exemptions
from overtime, but these provisions do not do enough. After a child
reaches one-and-a-half years of age, the mother is essentially at the whim of
an employer-performed balancing test as to whether her request for
decreased hours interferes with the employer's business operations. Injap-
anese society, where workers work an average 3,000 hours per year, the
balance will more often than not be struck in favor of the employer. Addi-
tionally, after her child reaches the age of six, the woman is left with no
aid-no statute requires the employer to honor any requests for exemption
from overtime, shortened work hours, or even exemption from night work.
Finally, and most importantly, the EEOL is still lacking an effective
enforcement mechanism. Although litigation is always an option, Japanese
culture is not fond of the litigious approach to dealing with problems 240
and litigation is incredibly long and costly. Moreover, mediation is often
an insufficient alternative because its effectiveness depends on voluntary
compliance and the proceedings are non-binding. 241 Publishing the names
of offenders is still available, but it has never been used and is not likely to
be effective at dissuading companies from becoming repeat offenders. In
addition to there not being any "sticks" to make the employers follow the
law, there are also no "carrots" or incentives for employers who follow the
law or even go beyond what the law requires. Tax breaks, additional fund-
ing, or government-sponsored advertising for firms who take proactive
steps toward gender equality could increase the number of Japanese com-
panies that make gender equality a priority and goal.
D. Current Situation of Japanese Women
As the above-cited statistics demonstrate, the situation of women in
Japan has not changed greatly since the passage of the original EEOL over
twenty years ago. In 2000, only 3.5% of women had jobs that held the
potential for promotion,242 and today, approximately two-thirds of Japa-
nese women quit work after becoming pregnant. 243 Dropping out of the
workforce has important consequences for working mothers because leav-
238. See 2006 EEOL, supra note 211, art. 9.
239. See id. art. 8.
240. Starich, supra note 18, at 570.
241. Id. at 571.
242. Budd, supra note 14, at 49.
243. Starich, supra note 18, at 568.
Cornell International Law Journal
ing the workforce erases an individual's past employment history and can
therefore adversely affect a woman's ability to receive a promotion.2 44 Nev-
ertheless, because many women who take leave face resentment from co-
workers who have to cover for the woman in her absence, many women are
reluctant to take maternity leave and quit instead. 24 5 Employers feed off of
this resentment by doling out the extra work created by the employee's
absence to other women, creating an environment where the worker feels
snubbed and put down by the hostile actions of her peers. 246 Men may
also take childcare leave, but they only do so at a rate of 0.56%.247 For
men, the fear of losing their job and the stigma associated with pawning off
their heavy workload is even greater.248
Although the situation for many women has not changed, women
themselves are beginning to change the way that they interact with society.
Many women today refuse to marry and have children, instead choosing to
live with their parents. 249 These women, referred to as "parasite sin-
gles,' 2 5 0 are ardent consumers, frequently travel to foreign countries on
extravagant vacations, and prefer to "live for the moment."25 1 Approxi-
mately 90% of Japanese women in their late twenties and 60% of Japanese
women in their late thirties are parasito.2 5 2 According to "Kiyoko," a
twenty-eight year old marketing executive for Toyota, "the Japanese system
is not fully prepared for both men and women to work while having chil-
dren .... Like other women, I would have to choose between my career or
my baby, and the reality is most women now are choosing careers. '25 3
Up until the 1970s, women often had to marry a man simply to sur-
vive. 25 4 Schooling and work focused only on acquiring the skills neces-
sary to attract and please a mate (i.e., cooking and house management). 25 5
The utmost goal for many Japanese women was to join a man's household
and solidify her place in the Japanese hierarchy. 25 6 In fact, a woman who
did not get married by age twenty-five was commonly called "Christmas
Cake"-no one wanted to purchase her on the twenty-sixth. 25 7 New jobs in
the emerging service economy, however, gave women incentives to pursue
advanced degrees and careers rather than marriage. 25 8 Today, only 11% of
women believe that marriage will prove financially beneficial due to the
feudal attitudes governing marriage and the crippling economic costs of
244. See Budd, supra note 14, at 49.
245. Starich, supra note 18, at 568.
246. See id.
247. Weathers, supra note 9, at 30.
248. See id.
249. See ZIELENZIGER, supra note 15, at 161.
250. Id. Sociologist Masahiro Yamada coined this term in 1999. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 161-62.
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child-rearing. 25 9
Ironically, in Japan, an increase in a woman's salary means a
decreased likelihood that the woman will marry.2 60 This statistic shows
that the "womb strike" is about more than simply fiscal concerns. Edu-
cated women want a "liberated" husband who will share the work of child-
rearing and allow the woman to work outside of the home.26 1 These
women look at the traditional Japanese "salaryman" as dasai (uncool) or
nasakenai (clueless). 2 62 The problem is the overriding Japanese sentiment
that "obviously no man would ever think of withdrawing from work
because of child-rearing."26 3 The intransigence of Japanese men extends to
areas other than child-rearing. For example, Japanese men spend an aver-
age of only twenty-five minutes per day on housekeeping and childcare,
while working Japanese women still spend an average of four hours and
twelve minutes per day on those activities. 2
64
Nevertheless, traditional Japanese ideals have been changing. Today,
only 49.7% of Japanese men and 41.2% of Japanese women agree with the
statement: "A husband should be the breadwinner and the wife should stay
at home."'2 65 These figures are down significantly from the 1979 poll that
asked the same question, with which 70% of respondents agreed. 26 6 Addi-
tionally, in 2000, 92.3% of respondents agreed that "[wie should envision
a society in which individual ability can assert itself regardless of sex."
2 67
Moreover, some Japanese firms are taking active steps to promote
women to positions of power. Sanyo and Daiei are two of a handful of
firms that have elevated women to the position of CEO,2 68 and many other
firms have ambitious plans for increasing the number of female managers
within their ranks. 26 9 Other firms have responded to the Japanese birth
crisis by adopting policies that are more sympathetic to the inability of
women with young children to relocate freely. 270 Asahi Mutual Life now
allows women on their management track to be exempt from job relocation
259. Id. at 165, 168.
260. Id. at 173-74. The trend is the reverse in the United States. Id.
261. Id. at 174.
262. Budd, supra note 14, at 52.
263. Dr. Sumiko lwao, Professor of Soc. Psychology at Musashi Inst. of Tech. & Mem-
ber of the Council for Gender Equal., Keynote Speech Policy Dialogue on Gender Equal-
ity: The Challenges and Strategies for Gender Equality in Japan (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at www.gender.go.jp/grobal/gbOl-kl.pdf.
264. See GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 6. Compare these numbers with
3.7 hours for men in Sweden and 2.6 hours for men in the United States. Id.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id. at 5.
267. Weathers, supra note 9, at 39.
268. See id. at 17.
269. See Firms More Committed to Female Workers, NIKKEI WEEKLY, May 1, 2007, at 1
(stating that "[miajor Japanese companies are revising their personnel systems so as to
retain women longer[, and some are] set[ting] goals for promoting more women to man-
agerial positions").
270. See id. (explaining that some companies "intend to introduce measures to allow
[women] to avoid relocation").
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while the woman has children under three years of age. 2 7 1 Additionally,
Kirin Brewery is in the process of adopting a system where management-
track employees may refuse to relocate for up to ten years. 272 Finally, Mit-
subishi has implemented a system that allows women to return to the com-
pany after being forced to quit due to a spouse's relocation. 273 Although
these steps are not alone sufficient to remedy the problem of gender ine-
quality, they show that some companies are willing to make changes to
accommodate female workers-an important step toward achieving a gen-
der equal society.
E. Current Plans of the Japanese Government
The Japanese government has made it a priority to achieve gender
equality and solve the current birth crisis. The government knows that
merely amending its equal employment opportunity laws will not be
enough and thus has made plans to tackle inequality on various other
fronts.274 On December 27, 2005, the Cabinet approved the Second Basic
Plan for Gender Equality-the second national plan based on the Basic Law
for a Gender-Equal Society.275 This Basic Plan has twelve priority fields on
which to focus with regard to improving the status of women both inside
and outside of the workplace:
1) Expanding women's participation in policy decision-making processes,
2) Reviewing social systems and raising awareness from a gender-equal
perspective,
3) Securing equal employment opportunities and treatment for men and
women,
4) Establishing gender equality in rural areas,
5) Supporting the efforts of men and women to harmonize work with fam-
ily and community life,
6) Developing conditions that allow the elderly to live with peace of mind,
7) Eliminating violence against women,
8) Supporting lifelong health for women,
9) Promoting gender equality in the media,
10) Promoting gender equality and diversity of choice in education,
11) Contributing to the "Equality, Development and Peace" of the global
community, and
12) Promoting gender equality in fields requiring new initiatives. 2 76
In addition to laying out these priority fields, the government has set
numerical targets that it hopes to achieve in each area. 27 7 For example, the
271. Id. at 2.
272. Id.
273. Id. (The Mitsubishi system allows "female employees that were forced to quit for
family-related reasons [to] return to their jobs within a certain period of time ....
[E]mployees with more than three years of service who are forced to quit because their
husbands have been transferred overseas will be given a three-year window in which to
come back .... ).
274. See generally GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 19.
275. Id. at 19.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 20-21.
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Gender Equality Bureau expects to see the proportion of women occupying
leadership positions increase to at least 30% by 2020.278 To reach this
goal, the government plans to actively employ women and to encourage
private companies to set targets for female employment. 2 79 National uni-
versities "will be required to make efforts" toward increasing the number of
female professors they hire. 280 Moreover, since 2001, each Ministry in the
government has enacted its own plan to enlarge the recruitment and pro-
motion of female national public officers. 28 1 Still, the percentage of
women in managerial government positions remains low. 282 In 2005, the
percentage of women occupying senior positions among public employees
was a low 1.7%.283
Finally, the government hopes to promote a zero-waitlist policy for
child care facilities by intensifying its efforts to increase the number of
children admitted to kindergartens.28 4 Additionally, because children of
all ages need adequate childcare, the government is enacting its "After-
School Plan for Children" to ensure that children have safe places and
activities to attend after school and on weekends. 28 5
These goals are extremely worthwhile, but Japan's plan of attack is
lacking. The government's plan still lacks any real incentives for compa-
nies to take action in recruiting and hiring more women. Additionally,
although the government can hire and promote women within its various
ministries, such efforts have only been minimally successful. Without
effective incentives to include more women in the corporate and public
worlds, Japanese employers will not promote women to positions of power.
Similarly, without adequate alternatives for long hours and an inability to
procure child care, it is unlikely that Japanese women with children will be
able to fill the managerial positions that may be open to them. Moreover,
the government again weakens the force of its proclamations by stating
that national universities only need to make efforts to hire more women
faculty. Like the "duty to endeavor" in the original EEOL, this request,
rather than requirement, likely will cause the government to fall short of its
goal.
Similar to the Second Basic Plan for Gender Equality, the Committee
for Deliberation of Supportive Measures for Women's Renewed Challenges
formulated the Plan of Support for Women's Renewed Challenges on
December 26, 2005.286 Amended in December of 2006, this plan is
directed at the problems women face in returning to work after having a
child. 28 7 As a result, efforts are underway to establish women's centers
278. Id. at 20.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 26.
282. Id. at 17, 26.
283. Id. at 17.
284. Id. at 20.
285. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 41.
286. GENDER EQUAL. BuREAu, supra note 13, at 27.
287. Id. at 28.
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that will provide comprehensive information to help women set life
goals.2 88 These centers will serve as support networks where women can
receive job information, skill development, and other services.28 9 The goal
is that these centers will make consultation services more accessible to
women with children and will encourage businesses to open their doors to
working mothers.2 9 0
Nevertheless, the Japanese government has done more than simply
plan to implement gender equality. It has taken active steps toward achiev-
ing that goal. For example, since 2001,Japan has celebrated Gender Equal-
ity week, a week filled with various events geared toward deepening public
understanding of the goals and philosophy of the EEOL.2 9 1 The week
entails poster distribution, public service announcements, and a confer-
ence, as well as the presentation of awards for companies that have taken
positive action to encourage female workers to utilize their talents. 292
Additionally, the government has created the Women's Information Net-
work (Winet),2 93 a portal website that links users to over 800 sites and
home pages with information to help women improve their status and
work toward a gender-equal society. 29 4 Finally, since October 2006, the
government has established a system that gives prefectural governments
the ability to create facilities to provide preschool and child care services in
the hopes of easing the child care obligation on Japanese women.2 95
III. The Situation in Norway
At a 2006 meeting of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, Norwe-
gian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg asserted "that the greatest gains coun-
tries can achieve, economically as well [as] politically, come with
empowering women, ensuring equal opportunity . . .and increasing the
ratio of women's active participation in working life." 2 96 This type of
national sentiment led the United Nations to rank Norway number one in
its Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and number two on its Gender
Gap Index (GGI). 29 7 As a developed nation with high rankings for gender
288. Id. Some of these centers, named "Mothers' Hello Work," opened in 2006.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 37.
289. GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 28.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 34.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 37. The website may be found at http://winet.nwec.jp/. Id.
294. Id.
295. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 38.
296. NOR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ACTION PLAN FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND GEN-
DER EQUALITY IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 2007-2009, at 12 (2007), available at http:/
/www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Utvikling/ActionPlanwomensRights.pdf.
297. See GENDER EQUAL. BUREAU, supra note 13, at 7. The GEM measures the extent of
women's participation in decision-making and economic and political life. Id. The GGI
measures whether disparities exist between men and women in the areas of the econ-
omy, politics, education, and healthcare. Id. It is important to note that Japan ranks
forty-second on the GEM and seventy-ninth on the GGI. Id.
Vol. 41
2008 Taming the Paper Tiger
equality, along with a relatively high fertility rate, 1.75% in 2002.298 Nor-
way serves as an ideal comparison with the Japanese system.
A. History of Gender Equality in Norway
Although today Norway stands as a bastion of gender equality, this
was not always the case. For example, in 1960, only 23% of Norwegian
women worked. 2 99 Indeed, in Norway, the traditional image of women as
caregivers remained stronger during the 1970s and 1980s than in any of its
Scandinavian neighbors. 30 0 As a rule, married women had most of the
responsibility for family care and housework. 30 1
During the labor shortage of the 1970s, however, women joined the
job market in increasing numbers, some of them filling jobs traditionally
held only by men.30 2 In fact, from 1972 to 1980, the number of employed
women increased by 184,800,303 with growth particularly in areas such as
the public sector, healthcare, teaching, and office work.30 4 Nevertheless,
employers doled out jobs that were typically reserved only for men to a
small number of specially chosen women.30 5 As in Japan, the hiring crite-
ria for women included factors such as age, marriage, and number of small
children.30 6 Unlike Japan, however, the Norwegian employers focused on
these factors for reasons unrelated to the woman's desirability as a wife.
An employer considered a woman to be a better candidate if she was a
married woman without small children.30 7 The goal for Norwegian
employers seemed to be to have steady and reliable employees, not young
brides for top executives. Additionally, although the ideal age for an
employee was twenty-five to forty-five years old, this age was ideal because
it was associated with decreased sick leave, 30 8 not because this was the
range in which women were considered most attractive.
While women joined the workforce in increasing numbers during the
1970s, many of them faced difficulties balancing work and family life.
Work, particularly "male" jobs, often started as early as 7:00 a.m., but kin-
298. See Arni Hole, Dir. Gen., Nor. Ministry of Children & Family Affairs, Childbear-
ing and Parenting in Low Fertility Countries: Enabling Choices (Jan. 12-14, 2004),
available at www.unece.org/pau/epf/present/ts2/hole.doc.
299. Gunvor Stromsheim, Working Hours and Segmentation in the Norwegian Labour
Market, in WORK AND WOMANHOOD NORWEGIAN STUDIES 49 (Arnlaug Leira ed., 1983).
300. Karoliina Ahtela, Promoting Equality in the Workplace: Legislative Intent and Real-
ity, in NORDIC EQUALITY AT A CROSSROADS: FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES COPING AITH DIFFER-
ENCE 70 (Eva-Maria Svensson et al. eds., 2004).
301. Stromsheim, supra note 299, at 53.
302. See Synnova Aga, Women's Attempts to Break Down Sex Barriers in the Labour
Market, in WORK AND WOMANHOOD NORWEGIAN STUDIES, supra note 299, at 88.
303. See Stromsheim, supra note 299, at 49-50.
304. Aga, supra note 302, at 91.
305. Id. at 93. "Male jobs" were those that were carried out by men alone or those in
which less than 15% of women participated. Id. at 122 n.3. For example, cleaning,
heavy packing, and bicycle production were all considered "male jobs" during the 1970s
and 1980s. Id. In 1980, only about 2,500 women had "male jobs." Id. at 116.
306. See id. at 93.
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dergartens and day care centers usually did not open until 8:00 a.m., mak-
ing it difficult for women to start their day as both mother and
employee. 30 9 Additionally, employers often denied requests for part-time
work or flexible working hours due, in part, to the belief that if women
wanted to work, they would have to do so under the same conditions as
men.3 10 As the government had not yet developed public child care
schemes for small children, 60% of families had to make private child care
arrangements. 3 11 Because of these difficulties in achieving work-life bal-
ance, many women worked only part-time. 3 12 Still, by 1978, 71% of
women with children under ten years of age and 42% of women with chil-
dren under two years of age were members of the workforce in some
capacity. 3
13
Women had problems with discrimination and harassment in their
new working environments. Employers felt that it was important not to
annoy their male workers by giving too many jobs to women or by giving
the "good jobs" to women. 3 14 Therefore, most employers gave women only
the jobs that men no longer wanted or that there were not enough men to
fill.3 15 Additionally, male workers were distrustful of their new female
counterparts and therefore often hostile. 31 6 Men felt that working women
were "militant feminists" who were challenging their position as breadwin-
ner and wanted to take over their jobs.3 17 Due in large part to the insecu-
rity of the male workers, women often experienced sexual harassment as a
form of "initiation" into the workplace. 3 18
Although the majority of the women in the Norwegian workforce were
not "militant feminists," many of the economic and political reforms that
occurred during the 1970s and beyond were thanks to the efforts of the
Norwegian feminist movement. 3 19 The idea of equality is not entrenched
in the Norwegian Constitution as it is in the constitutions of other coun-
tries. 3 20 The Norwegian Constitution does not contain a general "bill of
rights" or an exhaustive list of social, economic, or cultural rights to which
each person is entitled.32 1 Additionally, though courts recognize the
importance of women's rights, gender equality litigation in Norway was,
309. See id. at 106.
310. See id.
311. See Stromsheim, supra note 299, at 60.
312. See id. at 48.
313. Anne Maire Berg, Love and Power: The Division of Household Labour, in WORK AND
WOMANHOOD NORWEGIAN STUDIES, supra note 299, at 217.
314. Aga, supra note 302, at 94.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 104.
317. See id. at 101, 104.
318. See id. at 98.
319. See Ahtela, supra note 300.
320. See Meg Russell & Colm O'Cinneide, Positive Action to Promote Women in Politics:
Some European Comparisons, 52 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 587, 596 (2003).
321. Cecilie Ostensen Noss, Eur. Commission for Democracy Through Law, Gender
Equality in Norway, at 2, CDL-JU (2006)-028 Gune 12, 2006). In 1994, however, the
Norwegian government amended the Norwegian Constitution to state, "It is the respon-
sibility of the authorities of the State to respect and ensure human rights." Id.
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and still is, incredibly sparse. 32 2 Because of the lack of statutory, constitu-
tional, and case-law support for gender equality, feminist leaders had to
work hard to achieve gender equality legislation in Norway.3 23 Their work,
coupled with the recognition of business and the government that women
were a vital part of the labor force, led to the creation of the 1978 Act
Relating to Gender Equality.3 24
B. Norwegian Equality Laws: The Act Relating to Gender Equality,
Maternity Benefits, and the Use of Quotas
The purpose of the Act Relating to Gender Equality (the Act) is to pro-
mote gender equality and improve the position of women.325 The Act
imposes a duty on public authorities and employers to make active efforts
to promote gender equality within their enterprises. 3 26 These efforts can
include positive, or affirmative, action in favor of one of the sexes, as long
as the affirmative action is in conformance with the purpose of the Act. 32 7
The Act also prohibits direct and indirect differential treatment of both
men and women.328 The Act defines indirect differential treatment as "any
apparently gender-neutral action that in fact has the effect of placing one of
the sexes in a worse position than the other. '329 Additionally, job adver-
tisements may not be based on an applicant's sex unless there is an "obvi-
ous reason for doing so," and women and men must receive equal pay for
the "same work or work of equal value."'3 30 Moreover, there can be no dif-
ference between men and women concerning promotions, dismissals, hir-
ing, and layoffs.3 3 ' Finally, the Act ensures that men and women have an
equal right to education and prohibits gender-based and sexual
322. See id. at 4. For example, in a 1975 case before the Norwegian Supreme Court, a
man claimed that because he built a home for himself and his wife using his own money
and his own labor, the house belonged solely to him. Id. The Supreme Court, however,
ruled that the work of the housewife and her efforts in caring for the children were
necessary for the building of the house and, therefore, the house was joint property. Id.
323. See Ahtela, supra note 300.
324. See id.
325. Lov om likestilling mellom kjonnene [The Act Relating to Gender Equality], § 1
(2005) (Nor.).
326. See id. § la.
327. See id. § 3a.
328. See id. § 3. The Act defines direct differential treatment as "actions that[:] 1.
discriminate between women and men because they are of different sexes[;] 2. place a
woman in a worse position ... because of pregnancy or childbirth, or place a woman or
man in worse position ... because of her or his exercise of rights to take leave of absence
that are reserved for one of the sexes." Id.
329. Id. Indirect differential treatment, however, "is permitted if the action has an
objective purpose that is independent of gender, and the means that is chosen is suita-
ble, necessary and is not a disproportionate intervention in relation to the said pur-
pose." See id.
330. Id. §§ 4, 5. "Whether the work is of equal value shall be determined after an
overall assessment in which importance is attached to the expertise that is necessary to
perform the work and other relevant factors such as effort, responsibility, and working
conditions." Id. § 5.
331. Id. § 4.
Cornell International Law Journal
harassment.332
The Anti-Discrimination Ombud Act (ADOA) of 2005 gives the Equal-
ity and Anti-Discrimination Ombud the authority to enforce the Act by
monitoring compliance with the Act, deciding discrimination cases, or
bringing cases before the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. 333 If
the Ombud believes that an employer has violated the Act, the ADOA gives
the Ombud the discretion to impose coercive fines on the employer. 334
Importantly, if an individual or the Ombud brings a case of discrimination
before the Tribunal or a court, the person responsible for the alleged dis-
crimination has the burden of proving "on a balance of probabilities" that
the discriminatory treatment in question did not take place. 335 This
assumption of differential treatment demonstrates how seriously Norway
considers claims of gender discrimination.
Norway's gender equality laws also include a panoply of regulations
regarding maternity and paternity benefits. In Norway, parents are enti-
tled to very generous maternity and paternity leave. 336 Mothers can
receive their full salary and take leave for nearly one year, or they can
extend that year by accepting reduced benefits.337 Additionally, under the
Working Environment Act (WEA), each parent is entitled to a year off from
work without pay.3 38 To qualify for these forms of leave, both the mother
and father must have earned income for six of the last ten months prior to
the benefit period, meaning that the parents could have become employed
after the woman became pregnant and yet still receive the benefit. 339 The
parents, however, do not have to be married in order to qualify for leave. 340
Although mothers and fathers have similar rights, there are some
important differences. 341 For example, only women can receive leave ben-
efits before birth.342 Additionally, for the first six weeks after the birth, the
WEA prohibits mothers from returning to work to give them time to
breastfeed and recover without pressure from their employer. 343 Approxi-
mately one month of the maternity benefit period, however, is reserved for
332. Id. §§ 6, 8a.
333. Lov om Likestillings- og diskrimineringsombudet og Likestillings- og dis-
krimineringsnemnda [The Anti-Discrimination Ombud Act], §§ 1, 3 (2005) (Nor.).
334. See id. § 8.
335. Lov om likestilling mellom kjonnene [The Act Relating to Gender Equality],
§ 16.
336. See Hege Brekhus, Care and Social Rights in Norway, in NoRDIC EQUALITY AT A
CROSSROADS: FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES COPING WITH DIFFERENCE 91, 97 (Eva-Maria Sven-
sson et al. eds., 2004).
337. Id.
338. See Arbeidslivets lover [Working Environment Act], § 12-5(1) (2007) (Nor.).
339. Brxkhus, supra note 336, at 97; see also Arbeidslivets lover [Working Environ-
ment Act], § 12 (outlining the leave of absence to which parents are entitled).
340. Brekhus, supra note 336, at 98.
341. Id. at 97.
342. Id.
343. See Arbeidslivets lover [Working Environment Act], § 12-4; Br~ekhus, supra note
336, at 97. The WEA also gives parents the right to take paid leave to care for sick
children and the option to request shorter working hours to facilitate child care. See
Arbeidslivets lover [Working Environment Act], §§ 12-9, 10-2(3).
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fathers.344 If the father does not use this time, then the time is lost and the
maternity leave is one month shorter.345 This "father's month," introduced
in 1993, has been tremendously successful in increasing the number of
fathers who take parental leave. 3 46 In 1990, only 1.5% of fathers took
parental leave as compared to 78% in 1993. 34 7 Today, 90% of fathers take
advantage of the paternity leave, 348 and the success of "father's month" has
caused the Norwegian government to extend the parental leave to six
weeks. 349 Nevertheless, the parents can allocate their respective leave any
way they want.3 50 The mother receives the benefit even if the father stays
at home, but the father receives the benefit only if the mother returns to
work or attends school.351
Norwegian parents also are entitled to various governmental
allowances to help with child care. All parents with children under the
legal age of majority receive a child benefit allowance of approximately
11,664 crowns per child.35 2 The aim of the allowance, which is low and
could not itself cover the living costs for the child, is to improve the general
situations of families with children.353 Additionally, parents with children
under the age of three who do not attend a daycare funded by government
subsidies 35 4 or who only go to daycare part-time receive the Norwegian
Home Care Allowance (HCA). 355 The purpose of this allowance of approx-
imately 3,657 crowns per month, or less if the child is in daycare part-time,
is to improve the opportunities for parents to spend more time caring for
their children and less time working because of financial concerns. 356
Still, the allowance, which is approximately 43,884 crowns per year, is far
lower than the average Norwegian annual salary of 230,000 crowns. 35 7
Couple this discrepancy with the problem that a recipient is not required to
stay home and care for a child to receive the funds, and the result is ques-
tionable as to whether many parents use this money for its intended
purpose.35 8
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The final gender-equalizing tool that Norway utilizes is gender quotas.
Quota systems try to place the burden of recruitment on the individuals
who control the recruitment procedure, rather than on individual
women.35 9 The Norwegian government has a long history of quotas, dat-
ing back to the early 1980s. Since Gro Harlem Brundtland was Norway's
first female prime minister in 1981, no prime minister has had a cabinet
with less than 40% women in it.360 In 1992, the Norwegian Local Govern-
ment Act mandated that local standing committees should have a member-
ship that includes at least 40% of each sex.3 6 1 The Act Relating to Gender-
Equality expanded this quota to include any committee, governing board,
or council that a public body elects or appoints. 36 2 Although not legally
mandated to do so, the major Norwegian political parties have also
adopted a quota system with many political parties achieving an even 50-
50 split in nominating men and women.3 63 These quotas have paid off,
and as of May 1, 2006, the Norwegian parliament consisted of 37.9%
women.364
The most novel use of quotas came less than a decade ago. On Febru-
ary 21, 2002, the Norwegian Minister of Trade and Industry, Ansgar
Gabrielsen, announced that he would force Norway's biggest companies to
make 40% of the members of their boards of directors women.36 5 Gabriel-
sen made this decision after the United Nations described Norway as a
"haven for gender equality" but with some need for improvement in the
economic sector. 366 Norway, in fact, did need improvement in the area of
economic equality for women. In 2002, women comprised only 6.6% of
the board members of public stock companies, 3 67 yet women constituted
nearly 60% of college graduates. 368 Gabrielsen felt that it would be impru-
dent to ignore so many educated, potential directors.36 9 The new law
called for state-owned companies to meet the 40% quota almost immedi-
359. Ingrid Guldvik, Gender Quota Regimes and Ideas of Social Justice - The Quota
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ately 3 70 but gave publicly traded companies until mid-2005 to voluntarily
meet the 40% quota. 3 71 If the companies failed to do so, the law would
become mandatory and companies would have until January 1, 2008 to
meet the quota or would be "dissolved by order of the court of probate and
bankruptcy.
3 72
After the announcement of the quota, many business leaders reacted
angrily.3 73 Eivind Reiten, CEO of the Norwegian company, Norsk Hydro,
stated, "[T]he dangerous thing is not the number of women but that the
State wants to exert [its] ownership right."3 74 Une Amundsen, founder of
SuperOffice, declared, "I like women, but not by law."3 75 Other business-
men asserted that their companies would never be able to find enough
qualified women 3 76 and many critics of the law believed that Norway was
sacrificing quality for quantity.3 77 Even some women spoke out against
the new law. Bente Lowendahl, the first female professor at the Norwegian
School of Management, declared, "I'm glad I was chosen for my merits and
not because I'm a woman."3 78 Many other women worried that the new
law would cause tokenism. 3 79
Despite criticism, the members of the Norwegian government stood
behind their new law. The Minister of Children and Family Affairs, Laila
Davoy, said that the quota was a "matter of democracy. '380 Norwegian
Minister of Children and Equality Affairs, Karita Bekkemellem, stated that
this law would "see to it that women will have a place where the power is,
where leadership takes place in this society. '38 1 She added, "I do not want
to wait another 20 or 30 years for men with enough intelligence to finally
appoint a woman."3 82 Although the quota law clearly is a step forward for
gender equality, the law's creator, Trade Minister Gabrielsen, adamantly
denies that he implemented the law for feminist reasons.38 3 Rather,
Gabrielsen stated that he had read studies that showed that companies
with more women in management positions did better financially and that
he wanted to use the growing number of educated Norwegian women for
370. Id. at 40. This mandate was not a major problem as most state-owned compa-
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this purpose. 38 4 Nevertheless, he did assert, "[If [individuals] want to
invest in a company where they love to have men everywhere, do it. Do it!
For me, it's bullshit. It's just a crazy argument. 38 5
By the end of 2005, most Norwegian companies had not met the vol-
untary quota goal, increasing the number of women on corporate boards to
only 16% and, therefore, the government implemented the quota as law.
3 8 6
Although a 10% increase from 2002, this number was still a far cry from
the 40% quota and only marginally better than the United States, where
women hold approximately 15% of the board seats at the 500 largest com-
panies.38 7 In an effort to assist companies to find qualified female direc-
tors, the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO), set up
a program called "Female Future" to train women how to be board mem-
bers. 388 The NHO calls this process "pearl diving" because participating
companies have to search through their work forces to pick qualified, pos-
sibly hidden, women to train.389 As of August 2007, more than 400
women have completed the Female Future program, and nearly 100 of
them have offers to serve on a board.3 90
The grace period for companies to implement the 40% quota expired
in January 2008.391 So far, approximately 80% of Norwegian companies
have complied with the law, 39 2 and women fill 37% of the 1,117 board
seats of companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.3 93 Many of the non-
complying companies are expected to reach the quota by the end of Febru-
ary 2009, the date by which the second formal warning expires.3 94 Other
companies, however, are expecting to go private in an effort to avoid com-
pliance with the law.3 95 The media is also aiding the quota campaign by
publishing a list of firms not yet in compliance with the female quota.3 9 6
Sigrun Vageng, Executive Director of NHO, states that the government
"wouldn't put people out on the streets if companies are one woman
short."'3 97 However, Gender Equality Minister Manuela Ramin-Osmund-
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sen, has warned: "The law is clear. We will enforce the procedures. They
have not come out of nowhere. '3 98 As 2008 unfurls, the Norwegian gov-
ernment will have to show just how serious they are about their gender
equality quota.
C. Effects and Critiques
Thanks in major part to its equality laws, Norway has a relatively high
fertility rate and high workforce participation by women. As of 2001,
75.8% of women with children younger than two years old and 85% of
women with children ages three to six were in the workforce.3 99 As of
2002, however, 45% of these women worked part-time. 40 0 Additionally,
there is still a difference between the wages and pension benefits of men
and women,40 1 with women earning 85% of what men earn.40 2 Many
individuals think that this wage differential is due to women taking on
more domestic work than men.40 3 Norwegian males do approximately
40.4% of the housework and childcare. 40 4 Although this figure is higher
than those of both Japan and the United States, 40 5 women's organizations
feel that fathers are receiving more rights, such as increased paternity
leave, without being forced to take on increased responsibilities.40 6 It is
unclear how or if the government could force men to take on more respon-
sibilities in the home as a precondition to receiving the paternity benefits.
It is also questionable whether the child and homecare allowances are
beneficial to achieving gender equality. Some critics state that the
allowances may cause occupational passivity, causing women to become
reluctant to return to work and thereby stalling their seniority progress and
decreasing their pension.40 7 Due to the large discrepancy between the
allowances and the average Norwegian salary, however, it is unlikely that
occupational passivity would be a problem for couples of more limited
means. Other critics state that many parents may not want to use the
homecare allowance at all because they fear disapproval and gossip from
colleagues and others. 408 Japanese women experience a similar fear
regarding maternity leave. In both cases, the governments need to dissemi-
nate education about the benefits of a short period of homecare and
should work with companies to devise schemes that will decrease the bur-
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den on other employees when one employee takes maternity or paternity
leave. Finally, many NGOs say that providing a monetary benefit for chil-
dren who do not attend daycare creates a "black market for nannies,"
which in some cases, can lead to the exploitation of young women from
poor countries.40 9 Because a "black market" is hard to monitor, the only
other alternative is to abolish the homecare allowance. Until further stud-
ies are conducted to determine the true risk of exploitation in the "nanny
market," abolishing the homecare allowance would be too extreme of a
step.
The corporate board quotas are still too new to analyze their effect on
women and the corporate environment sufficiently. As of now, the quota
system has received mixed reviews. Many companies feel that the "punish-
ment" is disproportionate to the "crime" and that companies should decide
on their own who is most competent to run their boards.410 Additionally,
some new female board members are experiencing the sting of colleagues
who think that they are under-qualified. 4 11 For example, Heidi Marie
Petersen, a mother of two, demonstrated spreadsheet and strategy knowl-
edge, causing a fellow board member to exclaim, "Wow! You actually know
something about business. '4 12 Assumptions about women's lack of knowl-
edge and anti-women sentiments may create a hostile working environment
for female board members and could cause these women to doubt them-
selves and their qualifications. Still, many people think that the corpora-
tions and their male board members will shortly begin to come around to
the quotas.4 13 Sigrun Vaageng, NHO Executive Director in Charge of
Labor Issues, stated: "[T]he vigorous debate when the law was passed in
November 2003 is calming down. Companies are saying, 'This is Norway.
This is the law. We have to adapt.' ' 4 14
IV. A Possible Solution: The Comparative Approach
During the 1970s, Japan had proportionately more women in the
workforce than Norway.4 15 As of 2005, the roles had reversed; Japan still
has an "M-shaped" curve of employment, while Norway's turned trapezoi-
dal, with fewer women leaving the workforce due to childbirth.4 1 6 Japan,
however, has hope. If Japan takes into account its "latent labor force," or
percentage of women who want to work after giving birth but do not, the
"M-shaped" curve becomes flatter and trapezoidal. 4 17 Therefore, the Japa-
nese government must work to make these women's wishes come true.
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The case of Norway serves as a useful comparison for Japanese gender
equality law. Nevertheless, Norwegian equality laws are simply a starting
point for reform, as many aspects of the Norwegian laws may not fit well
with Japanese culture. For example, Norwegian men spend approximately
8% less time at work per week than Japanese men;4 18 therefore, the flexible
Norwegian leave and time laws may not suit Japan's work-focused, corpo-
rate life. Nonetheless, Japan must look to implement some of the laws and
strategies of successful, gender-equal countries, such as Norway, if it
intends to correct its declining birthrate.
First, Japan needs to take positive action to achieve gender equality in
the workplace. Positive action is any temporary measure that "realize[s]
substantial equal opportunity by offering a certain level of special opportu-
nities to workers who are suffering disadvantages due to ... discrimina-
tion.' '4 19 CEDAW allows and encourages positive action,4 20 and countries,
including Norway, have adopted the idea, not only as part of their gender
equality laws but also as an exception to discrimination. 42 1 Positive action
is extremely important in a culture such as Japan, where the ideals of
ryousai kenbo are still engrained. Although Japan has made advances in
gender equality since the passage of the original EEOL over twenty years
ago, the advances have been slow, leaving Japan one of the lowest ranked
industrialized countries with respect to gender equality.42 2 These facts
clearly show that Japanese culture and society make it difficult for Japa-
nese women to achieve positions of economic and political power without
some form of affirmative help.
The programs that the Japanese government recently created to help
mothers re-enter the working environment are important and beneficial,
42 3
but they are simply not enough. Although training women does help make
them marketable, it does not help change Japan's working culture. To truly
achieve a more gender-equal society, Japan must implement a plan of
affirmative action where companies are required, or encouraged through
incentives, to hire more women.
This affirmative action plan could be a formal quota regime, as in Nor-
way. A mandatory quota would ensure that women achieve positions of
power by creating target numbers and enforcing penalties for companies
who do not reach those numbers. Japan has already taken a small step
toward a quota regime by setting target percentages for women in leader-
ship positions. 424 Nevertheless, these targets are meaningless if the gov-
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ernment refuses to give companies any incentive to achieve, or any
disincentive not to achieve, them. Still, mandatory quotas with penalties,
such as fines or disbandment of the company, may not be the best option
for the consensus-oriented culture of Japan. These quotas have been con-
tentious even in more liberal-minded countries, such as Norway, and
would not likely be well received in a culture in which nearly 80% of indi-
viduals agreed that "there are jobs made for men and others made for
women. "425
Instead of enforcing a strict quota, the Japanese government should
use an incentive-based approach, giving companies that make policies
favorable to women certain benefits. Today, the government gives out
awards to companies that excel in the area of gender equality,4 26 but an
award is not sufficient. Alternatively, companies who hire or promote a
certain percentage of women could receive: (1) tax benefits, 42 7 (2) govern-
ment contracts or funding, or (3) advertisements paid for by the govern-
ment. Because Japanese companies need to improve overall with regard to
gender equality, the Japanese government could apply these incentives to
companies who excel in areas other than hiring and promotion, areas like
child care (e.g., providing daycare centers),4 28 generous child care policies
(e.g., providing maternity and paternity leave policies and encouraging
men and women to take part-time or flex-time work), and education (e.g.,
educating workers and the public about the importance of gender equality
in Japanese society).
Although Japan should create incentives to encourage companies to
implement positive action plans, it must also create penalties for compa-
nies that violate the current gender equality laws. Today, the EEOL
enforcement procedure is weak. Mediation is not only voluntary and non-
binding, but the "penalty" for non-compliance-publication-is never uti-
lized.429 Without an effective penalty for violations, the EEOL is nothing
more than a paper tiger that employers can violate without fear of repercus-
sions. To remedy this problem, Japan must add force to the law.
One option for enforcement is litigation. Japan is a non-litigious soci-
ety, however, and the length of the proceedings and the difficulty of wading
through its court system makes litigation a less attractive option. 430 Alter-
natively, Japan could adopt a model similar to that of Norway's Equality
and Anti-Discrimination Ombud and the Equality and Anti-Discrimination
Tribunal. 43 1 Instead of purely mediating, the EOMC could become a
mandatory arbitration body whose decisions would be binding on the par-
ties.4 32 Settlements could still be encouraged, but by making the process
mandatory and binding, the EOMC could provide force behind the
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EEOL. 4 3 3 Additionally, like the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud
and Tribunal, the EOMC should be able to impose monetary penalties for
damages relating to violations of the EEOL. The EOMC could also recom-
mend criminal sanctions for companies or individual employers who are
repeat offenders. If employers feared actual monetary or criminal penal-
ties, they would be less likely to violate the EEOL, and women would have a
more direct source of recourse if violations did occur.
To arbitrate claims of EEOL violations effectively, the EOMC would
need clearer guidelines from the government. Clear guidelines mean fine-
tuning the vague definition of indirect discrimination and providing addi-
tional examples of what would constitute indirect discrimination.
Although it is a somewhat ethereal term, indirect discrimination is possible
to define-Norway defines the term in Section 3 of the Act Relating to Gen-
der Equality.43 4 Japan could borrow this definition and modify it to its
desired specifications. Additionally, the Diet could include more examples
of what constitutes indirect discrimination. Waiting for the courts to spec-
ify further examples of indirect discrimination will be costly, time consum-
ing, and an ineffective use of the court's time. Therefore, the Diet should
further amend the EEOL to include the examples listed above,43 5 as well as
other illustrations that it deems pertinent. This list, of course, should also
be non-exclusive to account for anything that the Diet may have missed and
that could be elucidated through legislation. Courts and the EOMC will
benefit from as many firm guidelines as possible, and women will benefit
through effective enforcement of the gender equality laws.
Additionally, Japanese laws and policies need to move away from a
"male-centric" job model4 36 toward one that encompasses the idea of both
a working mother and father who share child and homecare responsibili-
ties. This shift in mentality means that Japan should amend its child care
leave laws, laws regarding child care centers, and even its tax laws. As the
Committee on the Declining Birthrate found in their international compar-
ison on maternity leave laws, countries that have diverse policies for child
care in the workplace have a higher birthrate than countries that are less
flexible with child care options. 43 7 Under the current CCFCLL, workers
are entitled to a fairly generous amount of leave-one year that can be
extended up to one-and-a-half years.4 38 Nevertheless, Japan can still
improve the CCFCLL.
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First, child care leave is available to both sexes, but as of 2003, only
0.56% of Japanese men took paternity leave.4 3 9 In this instance, Norway
serves as a perfect example for Japan to emulate. In the early 1990s, Nor-
way also had gender-neutral child care leave, but only a small number of
fathers took it. 4 4 0 After instituting the "father's month," however, the
amount of fathers taking child care leave skyrocketed. 4 4 1 If Japan insti-
tuted a similar plan, reserving one month of the child care leave specifi-
cally for fathers, it may see similar results. With both men and women
taking leave to care for children, companies would have less of an incentive
to discriminate against women. Although Norwegian men may take child
care leave in greater numbers because the leave is paid, Japan could offer
incentives to companies who allow their employees a certain amount of
paid leave, making it easier for families who need the money to take child
care leave.
The CCFCLL should also extend its protections to children older than
age six. Limiting the right to take unpaid leave to care for a sick child to
parents with children under six years of age is problematic because parents
with children above this age are faced with the possibility of not being able
to care for their sick children. The government should extend the right to
take unpaid leave to parents with children under the legal age of majority.
Additionally, shortened work hours and flexible time schedules should be
available to all workers with children under the legal age of majority, not
just workers with children younger than three years of age. Flexible work
arrangements make it easier for women to have both a meaningful career
and children. With this viable alternative, women may be less likely to put
off marriage and childbirth, thereby increasing Japan's birthrate.
Finally, Japan should reform both its laws regarding child care centers
and its discriminatory tax laws. Currently, Japan has a discriminatory tax
law that causes couples in which both spouses earn more than 1.03 million
yen per year to be taxed more harshly. 442 This law is a disincentive for
women who do not work or who only work part-time to join the workforce
fully. Perhaps more importantly, it is a disincentive for the "parasite sin-
gles" to give up their financial freedom, get married, and have children. If
Japan does not want to rescind this discriminatory law, it could utilize the
money it earns from the tax to help subsidize child care centers or to give
parents with young children a child care allowance. Norway has exper-
ienced much success with both its state-sponsored daycare centers and its
child and homecare allowances. 4 43 The reluctance of some Japanese
women to marry due to the high cost of child care and education shows
that Japanese women may approve of similar laws.444 It is, however,
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unclear whether the rest of Japanese society would approve of such a lib-
eral plan.
Conclusion
To change the track of its declining birthrate, Japan must make
changes to its gender equality laws and policies. Although Japan has
recently implemented reforms to the EEOL, these reforms simply do not go
far enough. Japan must strive to mirror countries like Norway by imple-
menting positive action plans to get more women into positions of power
and by increasing the flexibility of its child care leave laws. Moreover,
Japan must work to ease the burden of child care on women through either
subsidization of child care or policies that encourage men to take paternity
leave. Finally, Japan must give the paper tiger of the EEOL teeth through
the creation of a binding enforcement mechanism with the power to
impose monetary penalties.
Attitudes of younger Japanese citizens suggest that Japanese society
may be ready to step away from the traditional ideas of ryousai kenbo and
embrace more gender-equal practices. 445 This support from Japanese
youth indicates that Japan could take the affirmative steps needed to imple-
ment effective gender equality laws. Although the process of achieving gen-
der equality in Japan will be difficult and may require challenging the
consensus-based nature of Japanese society, Japanese lawmakers must
aggressively address their gender inequality problem in order to sustain
their economy and ensure the necessary growth of their population.
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